Research

"Nihilism, But Not Necessarily" (Forthcoming at Erkenntnis )

Abstract: It’s widely accepted that we have most reason to accept the theory/theories that best fulfill the criteria: i) internal consistency, ii) consistency with the facts, and iii) exemplification of the theoretical virtues. It’s also widely accepted that metaphysical theories are necessarily true. Here I will show that if you accept the familiar set of criteria, then you have most reason to reject that metaphysical theories are necessarily true. I’ll begin, by showing that, with the exclusion of parsimony, the methodology above gives us no way to choose between the three theories of composition: Nihilism, Universalism, and Restrictivism. I then argue that Nihilism is the most parsimonious of the three theories, and hence that we ought to accept Nihilism if we accept the methodological criteria above. Finally, I show that applying the theoretical virtues has the interesting result that we have most reason to accept that principles of composition are contingent.

"The Dissolution of the Problem of Exclusion"

Abstract: It is common coin that the mental property of desiring a sip of water causes can cause certain physical events like walking to a water fountain. What’s puzzling is how this causation can occur. How is it that mental properties, e.g., your desiring water, can cause physical events, e.g., your walking to a water fountain? I show that mereological nihilism has the theoretical capacity to make sense of our common beliefs about the causality of our mental states. Many philosophers such as Donald Davidson (1963), Jagewon Kim (1998), and Robert Van Gulick (1993) have undertaken this project to explain how the mental and the physical causally interact. I argue that although much of our mental property talk is true, we are not ontologically committed to any mental properties. There are true sentences that include the term ‘mental property’ that attribute causal powers to those mental properties. Those sentences are made true by microphysical objects and properties arranged in certain ways in space-time. I argue that given how terms and predicates apply to different arrangements of particles and properties in space time, it is also true to say that certain events, like desiring a sip of water, are mental qua having certain properties that can correctly be called mental properties. This is an improvement on Davidson's view because it offers an explanation of how mental properties can truly be said to be causal and this is lacking in Davidson's account.

"Objects and Simples: The Nomological Account" (Under Review)

In this paper, I explore what simples and objects would be like if simples were possibly extended. I assume that the objects that should appear in our ontology are precisely the objects that must appear in the theory of the world that tests best against the theoretical virtues. I then argue that the only objects in the correct ontology at a world are the objects that are causally non-redundant at that world. For instance, at this world, I argue, that objects in the correct ontology are each involved in unique set of nomologically possible events. There are no two objects that are involved in the same events at every nomologically possible world. For example, consider what might be an object at this world, a single quark. This quark is an object at this world if and only if there are no other objects that are involved in the exact same set of nomologically possible events. Suppose this quark is in fact an object at this world. This quark will appear in the theory of the world that tests best against the theoretical virtues since without it the theory will either be incomplete or not parsimonious. In addition, I argue that this quark must be a simple at this world. This account of objects and simples has not yet been explored in the literature, but given the commonly accepted methodology, I show that we have reason to prefer it.

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Research